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I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY AND THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PROBLEM
When Saddam Hussein was re-elected President of Iraq in October
of 2002, he claimed what undoubtedly ranks as the greatest electoral vic-
tory of all time, winning 100% of the vote in an election in which 100%
of the electorate voted.' This remarkable performance edged out Hus-
sein's own previous best, when he received only 99.96% of the vote in
1995.2 Few regard these elections as legitimate, of course; Hussein is
widely understood to have been a dictator, not a democratically-elected
president. Hussein ran unopposed in both elections, and voters' only
choices were "Yes" or "No" in a referendum on whether to extend Hus-
sein's absolute power for another seven-year term.3 As the world knows,
words like fraud and intimidation do not begin to capture the conditions
under which these elections took place.4
The sham elections in Iraq under Saddam Hussein are perhaps the
best recent evidence of what has been called the "nonnegotiable political
status" of democracy in the modem era: the idea that democracy has at-
tained an "obligatory character" because it is demonstrably superior to
other forms of government.5 Today even absolute dictators seldom reject
t Oliver Hall is Executive Director of the Center for Competitive Democracy, a Washington, D.C.-
based non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating barriers to political participation and securing
free, open, and competitive elections. The author would like to thank Professor David Lyons of
Boston University, Richard Winger, Editor of Ballot Access News, and the editors of the Seattle
University Law Review for their helpful comments.





5. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY I (Princeton Univ. Press 2003).
Seattle University Law Review
democracy outright, but argue instead that their people are not yet ready
for democracy or, as in Hussein's case, that their governments are actu-
ally more democratic than they appear.
6
But if democracy has attained near-unanimous endorsement as a
political ideal, considerably less agreement exists as to what democracy
actually entails. When the Greeks coined the term demokratia to describe
the government of their city-states some 2500 years ago, the system was
distinguished from the aristocracies that preceded it by the political
equality of each citizen. The word demokratia means "rule of the peo-
ple," or as we say today, majority rule. These two concepts, political
equality and majority rule, remain fundamental to any modern theory of
democracy, and no political system that does not aspire to both can
rightly be called democratic. But democracy remains a contested ideal
because these fundamental concepts are in tension. The tension arises
because majority rule can produce outcomes that infringe upon the po-
litical equality of the minority: most obviously, it can prevent the minor-
ity from participating in the political process. 8 When and how to protect
the minority in a system of majority rule-the "countermajoritarian prob-
lem" of democracy-is an ongoing question for any democratic state.
This Article explores one instance of the countermajoritarian prob-
lem in American democracy: how to protect the rights of minor parties
and independent candidates participating in an electoral system domi-
nated by two major parties. In particular, this Article focuses on the ef-
fect of modern ballot access laws on candidates' rights, arguing that
courts ought to treat these laws as a presumptively impermissible form of
"collusion in restraint of democracy." 9 Although the article borrows the
language of antitrust law, this argument is rooted in core constitutional
principles and rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Nevertheless, the analogy to antitrust law is useful as a means to
address the decline of electoral competition in the United States and its
consequences for the democratic character of our government. Antitrust
6. Id. See also Burns, supra note I at 19 (A spokesperson for the Iraqi government defended
the claimed turnout and 100% mandate as a "true" figure. "Don't evaluate this from an intellectual
viewpoint, or make comparisons from your experience in the West; Iraq is quite different," the
spokesperson told reporters.). See also ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 100 (Yale Univ. Press
1998) (stating that "V.I. Lenin once asserted: 'Proletarian democracy is a million times more democ-
ratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet government is a million times more democratic than the
most democratic bourgeois republic."').
7. DAHL, supra note 6, at 11-12. The chief characteristic of the Greek city-state was an assem-
bly in which all citizens were entitled to participate, and in which each citizen had an equal opportu-
nity to serve as the most important officer, who was chosen by random lottery.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 60-62 for an argument that some bipartisan legislation might
constitute a form of"collusion in restraint of democracy."
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law also provides a legal framework for distinguishing between nonparti-
san and bipartisan legislation, as the analogy helps distinguish between
legitimate regulation of the political process by the state and collusion in
restraint of democracy by the two major parties.
Part II begins with a discussion of elections' function in a democ-
racy, addressing the lack of electoral competition in the United States
and identifying prominent anticompetitive features of American democ-
racy, mainly modem ballot access laws. Part II provides a brief history of
ballot access laws in the United States and an analysis of their justifica-
tion. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's modem ballot access juris-
prudence, starting with the first minor party challenge to a modem ballot
access law in 1968 and tracing the erosion of candidates' rights since
then. Finally, Part IV sketches an approach to ballot access jurisprudence
that offers greater protection to candidates' rights by analyzing ballot
access laws according to the principles of antitrust law.
II. THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN DEMOCRACY
Most of the important decision-making in the Greek city-states was
performed by an Assembly, to which all citizens were admitted." In this
form of democracy, political equality was secured to the extent that each
citizen had an equal opportunity to participate directly in the decisions by
which he would be bound. 12 While direct democracies still exist (for ex-
ample, in the local governments of some New England states), practical
considerations strictly limit their size.' 3 Modem democratic governments
are therefore representative; the sheer number of people involved makes
the direct participation of each person impossible. For this reason, the
election of representatives can be considered the fundamental transaction
of modem democracy, because elections are the primary means by which
citizens participate in the government that represents them.
The reasons democracy remains a contested ideal become apparent
when the mechanics of the fundamental voting transaction are fleshed
out. It is not clear, for example, exactly how elections bring about a rep-
resentative government. Under one view, elections ensure that govern-
ment represents the people by causing elected officials to be responsive
to voters.' 4 Under this view, a representative government is one that
10. See id.
11. See Jon Elster, Accountability in Athenian Politics, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND REPRESENTATION 259-60 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
12. Women, slaves, and resident aliens were all excluded from political participation. See id.
13. See DAHL, supra note 6, at 105-12, for an account of the practical limitations of direct
democracy.
14. DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 10 (Adam Przeworski, Susan
Stokes, & Bernard Manin eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
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adopts the policies voters signal that they prefer. Alternatively, a gov-
ernment might be considered representative if elections enable citizens to
hold elected officials accountable. 15 Under this view, a government is
representative of whatever policies it adopts as long as voters can hold
elected officials accountable by voting for or against them in the next
election. 16
Further disagreement exists over what counts as a representative
government and what a government must do in order to represent the
people. Some argue that elected officials must act on the wishes of the
majority; others argue that officials should act in the way the officials
think is best for the majority.17 Some argue that officials should act as the
majority wanted when a policy was adopted; others argue that officials
should act as the majority would want in retrospect. 18 Disagreement ex-
ists even with regard to who constitutes the majority-is it the specific
majority that elected a representative, or any majority? None of these
questions has a definite answer; the only thing that seems clear is that a
government is not representative if it acts in a way that no majority
wants. 19
One important fact cannot be overemphasized in light of these dis-
agreements. Lack of theoretical consensus has not inhibited the devel-
opment of democracy in the real world. Since 1980, at least eighty-one
countries, thirty-three of them military dictatorships, have shifted from
authoritarian to democratic rule. 20 Moreover, the basic formal structure
of representative democracy has not changed for the last two centuries:
in every representative democracy, citizens select representatives in elec-
tions; citizens are free to make demands, but not to issue binding instruc-
tions; and the representatives remain subject to periodic elections.2 1 What
this illustrates-the proliferation of democratic states and the historical
stability of democratic structures-is that democracy is an eminently vi-
able form of government, even if theorists cannot agree as to how or
why.
Given the divergent views with respect to the basic purpose and





19. See generally id. at 4-10.
20. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 2. See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Univ. of Okla. Press 1991) for an account
of the spread of democracy through Africa, Asia, Latin America, South America, Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union.
21. DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 14, at 3.
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with certainty about the role of elections in representative democracy is
that they issue an authorization to rule.22 But certain conditions follow
from this basic fact that are consistent with any theory of democracy.
First, if the authorization is to be valid, then it must be given freely-
citizens must be free to vote for the candidate of their choice. Second,
candidates must be free to participate in elections and compete for citi-
zens' votes. Third, entry barriers should not be so great that candidates
advocating alternative policies are excluded from the competition. To be
sure, these "competitive conditions" prescribe an ideal that no actual de-
mocracy completely fulfills. Ultimately, however, a state is more democ-
ratic to the extent that it meets these conditions, and less democratic to
the extent that it falls short of them.23
Generally speaking, the more restrictive the political process-the
more citizens it excludes, and the more limitations it imposes on those
who do participate-the less competitive the electoral system and the
less democratic the government it produces.24 At one extreme are auto-
cratic states with sham elections; at the other is ideal democracy, in
which every citizen enjoys an equal opportunity to participate directly in
the decisions by which he or she is bound. Modem democratic states in-
evitably fall short of this ideal because they necessarily rely on a system
of representation. Even within this limitation, however, states can be-
come more democratic by adopting rules that enhance rather than restrict
electoral competition.
A. Electoral Competition and Anticompetitive Conditions
in American Democracy
This article began with an account of the sham elections that Sad-
dam Hussein staged every seven years in Iraq. Those elections provide a
stark illustration of a system that exhibits the formal characteristics of
representative democracy-citizens choosing representatives in regularly
scheduled elections-but which is utterly devoid of electoral competi-
tion. The Iraqi people may have elected Hussein, but they were not free
to vote for another candidate, nor was Hussein compelled to compete
against any other candidates. But if Hussein's sham elections represent
one extreme on the democracy spectrum, it would be incorrect to suggest
that American elections represent the other. In fact, a growing number of
22. Id at 22.
23. See generally id. See also SHAPIRO, supra note 5; DAHL, supra note 6. The notion that
democracy requires "free, fair, and competitive elections" is so uncontroversial that many treat it as
the definition of democracy itself. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Universal Democracy?, POL'Y REVIEW
ONLINE, http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
24. See generally DAHL, supra note 6.
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American elections have only one candidate, and competition is declin-
ing throughout our entire electoral system.
In Hawaii, for example, more than one-third of the elections for the
state legislature routinely go uncontested. 25 Large numbers of voters in
Hawaii, having no other options, often cast blank ballots to protest their
lack of choice.26 Yet Hawaii is not even in the top ten states nationally
with the highest percentage of uncontested elections. In 2002, South
Carolina topped that list, with 71.8% of its elections for the state legisla-
ture uncontested. 27 Alaska rounded out the 2002 list, coming in at num-
ber ten with 55% of its elections uncontested.28 In 2004, Arkansas topped
the list at 74.6%, and North Carolina was number ten with 52.4% of its
elections uncontested. 29 But if these states represent the worst cases, then
Hawaii represents the norm: the national average of uncontested elec-
tions for state legislatures was 36.9% in 2002, and 38.7% in 2004.3o
Electoral competition is suffering at the federal level as well. Com-
petition in Congressional elections, measured by the number of relatively
close races, has been declining for more than fifty years. The 2002 and
2004 elections, respectively, were the least competitive yet. Of the 435
seats up for election in 2004, only twenty-two were decided by a margin
of less than ten percentage points, while 172 were either uncontested or
won by a margin of at least forty percentage points; incumbents, mean-
while, enjoyed a ninety-nine percent re-election rate in 2004.31 Competi-
tion for control of the House itself now concentrates on a diminishing
number of districts scattered across the country, while the number of safe
seats that go uncontested has increased dramatically since the 1970s.32
The competitive situation of Senate elections is similar, if not quite
as bleak. Of the twenty-eight incumbents that ran for re-election in 2000,
only twelve faced significant competition.33 In Arizona, not one of the
800,000 registered Democrats bothered to challenge Republican Senator
Jon Kyl for his seat, and many other veteran Senators routinely run for
re-election unopposed. For example, Senators such as Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts, Orrin Hatch of Utah, and Daniel Akaka of Hawaii
25. Id.
26. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).




31. Alan . Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, and
the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, J. OF POL. (forthcoming Feb. 2006). See also
Carl Weiser, For Most Incumbents in Congress, Re-election is a Sure Bet, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE
(Oct. 20, 2000), available at http://www.fairvote.org/op_eds/mort IOOO.htm#carl.
32. Id.
33. Weiser, supra note 31.
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usually face little or no opposition in their re-election bids.34 The rate of
re-election for incumbent Senators has not dropped below seventy-five
percent since 1980, and is usually closer to ninety percent or higher.
35
Competition is also declining in presidential elections. Incumbent
presidential candidates do not run unopposed, of course, but competition
is narrowed by other means. Most notably, the Electoral College func-
tionally divides the race for President into forty-eight separate, statewide,
winner-take-all elections (except for Nebraska and Maine, which allocate
their electors according to the popular vote). 36 Because the same major
party consistently wins most states, the popular vote is competitive in
only a dozen or so battleground states.37 Everywhere else, presidential
candidates are free to treat the vote as a foregone conclusion.38 And the
situation is only getting worse: in 1960, twenty-four states were consid-
ered battlegrounds, but in 2004, only thirteen states were competitive,
and competition is declining in five of those states.39 Even the 2004
presidential election, which was considered so divisive, was no more
competitive for its perceived acrimony. The same dynamic between safe
states and battleground states played out, while the candidates were
widely reported to converge on important policy issues rather than to
compete by offering alternative positions.4 °
Many factors are to blame for the decline of electoral competition
in the United States. Probably the most widely recognized is the high
cost of running for office.41 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Buck-
34. Id.
35. The Big Picture: Reelection Rates over the Years, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/
reelect.aspCycle=2002&chamb=S (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2-3. However, it is important to note that the Constitutional
provisions establishing the Electoral College do not prescribe a winner-take-all system. See Lee
Mortimer, Elections Give Voters Too Little Say, FAIRVOTE.ORG (2000), available at http://
www.fairvote.org/op eds/mortI 000.htm#lee.
37. See Mortimer, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. See CTR. FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, THE SHRINKING BATTLEGROUND: THE 2008
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND BEYOND, available at http://www.fairvote.org/media/perp/Shrinking
_BattlegroundFinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
40. See, e.g., Michael Kranish & Yvonne Abraham, As rivals focus, stances seem to blur,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2004, at A29. "Rifts are few on big issues" was the sub headline on this
story, which featured a sidebar detailing the similarities between the candidates' positions on issues
like tax cuts, health care, Social Security, the war on terror, and jobs. Among the most obvious ex-
amples, both candidates favored the military occupation of Iraq by the United States, even though
roughly half the population supported the withdrawal of American troops. See Interview by Gwen
Ifill, PBS Newshour, with Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Center, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 26,
2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june04/public 04-26.html (citing
poll data indicating that 53% of Americans believe American troops should not remain in Iraq).
41. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW: WINNING VS. SPENDING
(2005) [hereinafter WINNING VS. SPENDING], available at http://www.crp.org/overview/bigspenders
.asp?cycle=2004 (demonstrating that the top fifty candidates for seats in the U.S. House of Repre-
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ley v. Valeo, which struck down limits on overall campaign expendi-
tures, 42 the cost of running for office has spiked. Despite passage of the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, otherwise known as the
McCain-Feingold Bill, the cost is only increasing.43 The 2004 presiden-
tial election, for example, was the most expensive in history, with the
two major party candidates spending a combined total of more than $650
million.44 In the most expensive Senate race of 2004, two candidates
from South Dakota spent a combined total of more than $36 million.45 In
the most expensive House race of 2004, two candidates from Texas Dis-
trict 32 spent a combined total of more than $9 million.46 Since candi-
dates who outspend their rivals nearly always win the election, the post-
Buckley campaign finance system presents a strong disincentive for non-
wealthy candidates to run.47 The de facto exclusion of these candidates
from the electoral system is now so prevalent that the phenomenon has
become known as the "wealth primary.
' 48
Gerrymandering is another factor contributing to the decline of
competition in American elections.49 The process of drawing electoral
maps in a manner that gives one party an advantage by diluting the oppo-
sition's voting strength is nearly as old as American democracy itself, but
it remains widespread today.5 ° Since gerrymanders purposely aggregate
like-minded voters, they render the outcome of the vote a foregone con-
clusion, effectively eliminating electoral competition in the gerryman-
dered district. The decline of competition in U.S. House elections bears
this out: not only has the number of safe House seats risen dramatically
in the last few decades, but the proportion of safe to competitive seats
has increased with each redistricting process since 1980.51
Although they receive relatively little scrutiny, modem ballot ac-
cess laws are probably the most obviously anticompetitive feature of the
American electoral system. One reason for the inattention may be that
sentatives commonly outspend the next highest vote-getter by a ratio of ten to one); see also JAMIN
RASKIN & JOHN BONIFAZ, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., THE WEALTH PRIMARY (1994).
42. 425 U.S. 946 (1976).




47. Id. See also RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 41.
48. See RASKIN & BONIFAZ, supra note 41.
49. One of the most notorious recent examples occurred when Republicans gained control of
the Texas House in 2002. Democratic Representatives actually fled the state en masse in order to
deprive Republicans of the quorum necessary to vote on a newly gerrymandered electoral map. See
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Power Politics (PBS television broadcast Dec. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/j uly-dec03/districts_ 12-25.html.
50. See Abramowitz, Alexander, & Gunning, supra note 31.
51. Id.
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these laws arose at different times and in different states across the nation
over a span of more than fifty years. Nevertheless, ballot access laws
impose direct barriers to entry on minor party and independent candi-
dates, and are far more restrictive than necessary to further any legitimate
state interest. 53 Moreover, the laws discriminate based on party status,
imposing different requirements on major party, minor party, and inde-
54pendent candidates. Major party candidates are automatically listed on
the ballot as long as their party achieved some percentage of the vote in
the previous election. 55 Minor party and independent candidates, how-
ever, can rarely hope to qualify under this criterion and must overcome
an increasingly burdensome battery of substantive and procedural barri-
ers.
56
The legal structure of modem ballot access laws appears at first to
be value-neutral and its party-based classifications appear rational.
57
Well-established political parties should not be required to demonstrate
over and over again what previous electoral results clearly show-that
the parties enjoy a significant amount of voter support. Minor political
parties and independent candidates, by contrast, have usually made no
such showing, and ought to be required to demonstrate some measure of
voter support before gaining the right to appear on the ballot. But this
legal structure creates a conflict of interest for the major party politicians
who enact ballot access laws through the state legislatures.58 Since major
party candidates need not comply with the laws' requirements, major
party politicians have an incentive to exclude competitors by enacting
52. See Richard Winger, The Supreme Court and the Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Re-
view ofienness v. Fortson, I ELECTION L.J. 235, 236-37 (2002).
53. See KAREN M. MARKIN, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, BALLOT ACCESS 3: FOR PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES (1995) for a state-by-state guide to ballot access requirements for minor party and
independent candidates. See also Bradley A. Smith, Regulation and the Decline of Grassroots Poli-
tics, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000); Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights:
Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1991). Bradley A. Smith, a former Fed-
eral Election Commissioner, is openly critical of restrictive ballot access laws as lacking any legiti-
mate state purpose.
54. See MARKIN, supra note 53.
55. See id.
56. A nearly exhaustive account of the hurdles facing minor party and independent candidates
is available at http://www.ballot-access.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
57. Except for Nebraska, which holds an officially nonpartisan election for its unicameral state
legislature, the legislature of every state has been controlled by the Republicans and Democrats since
at least 1938. Usually one of the major parties controls the legislature by virtue of its majority, but in
some cases the legislature is split between the two major parties. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, PARTISAN CONTROL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1938-2004 (2005), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/hstptyct.htm. Currently, fewer than two dozen of the
7382 state legislators are independent or minor party members. See id
58. See id.
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excessively restrictive laws. 59 And in fact, as ballot access laws have be-
come more restrictive, the formerly "permanent minor parties" in the
United States have appeared on fewer and fewer state ballots.6 °
The self-interested nature of ballot access legislation enacted by
major party politicians is particularly troubling given that the laws are
enforced by Secretaries of State who invariably are major party politi-
cians themselves. 61 The decision to include particular candidates on the
ballot thus presents these officials with a conflict of interest, since selec-
tive enforcement of ballot access laws can be an effective means of ex-
cluding candidates for partisan purposes. In its 2005 report, "Building
Confidence in U.S. Elections," the Commission on Federal Election Re-
form, a bipartisan body headed by former Democratic President Jimmy
Carter and former Republican Secretary of State James Baker, noted the
danger of this system:
Most other democratic countries have found ways to insulate elec-
toral administration from politics and partisanship by establishing
truly autonomous, professional, nonpartisan and independent na-
tional election commissions that function almost like a fourth
branch of government. The United States, too, must take steps to
conduct its elections impartially both in practice and appearance.
62
Despite the Commission's unequivocal language, the report never
specifically addresses the conflict of interest that ballot access laws pose.
But if American elections are to be conducted impartially, then the abil-
ity of self-interested incumbents to exclude competitors must be ad-
dressed. It is no coincidence that voter turnout in the United States has
been declining steadily for decades as laws that restrict voter choice have
increased.6 3
B. A Brief History of Ballot Access Laws in the United States
The first elections in the United States were conducted orally or by
a showing of hands, and thus required no ballot or ballot access laws.
64
59. Id.
60. See Winger, supra note 52, at 237 (noting that the nation's "permanent minor parties" of
the 1930s and 1940s, which included the Socialist, Prohibition, Communist, and Socialist Labor
Parties, are appearing on fewer and fewer state ballots).
61. See generally The National Association of Secretaries of State, Secretary of State Biogra-
phy Links, http://www.nass.org/sos/sos-bios.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
62. See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 49
(2005), available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf.
63. See FED. ELECTION COMM'N, NATIONAL VOTER TURNOUT IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 1960-
1996, http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
64. ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-6 (1917).
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But the public nature of these elections lead to rampant intimidation and
bribery of voters, and within twenty years, most states had shifted to
elections conducted by paper ballot.65 These first paper ballots were not
subject to state regulation; rather, voters created their own ballots by
writing a candidate's name on a piece of paper and delivering it to the
polling station. 66 Paper ballots thus helped reduce intimidation and brib-
ery by enabling voter privacy. Eventually, political parties began printing
ballots listing only their candidates' names, and distributing them to as
many voters as possible.67 These ballots were brightly colored and dis-
tinctive, so that it was readily apparent which candidate a voter had se-
lected.68 The loss of voter privacy led once again to an epidemic of vote
buying, as onlookers could easily verify a voter's choice. Fraud and har-
assment also became widespread: many voters were coerced into voting
for particular candidates, or failed to vote altogether from fear of retribu-
tion.69 As the Supreme Court has noted, "these early elections were not a
very pleasant spectacle for those who believed in democratic govern-
ment.
70
The first official state ballots were not printed until 1888, when
they were introduced in Massachusetts and New York. 71 They were
known as "Australian ballots" because they originated in several Austra-
lian provinces that had experienced similar problems with voter intimida-
tion and fraud.72 The primary purpose of the Australian ballots was to
restore voter privacy by including all candidates for office on one confi-
dential official state ballot. Regulation of ballot access by the state arose
only as a necessity incidental to this purpose. The intention was to grant
free and easy ballot access to every candidate in order to ensure the con-
fidentiality of every voter's choice. Many states did not impose substan-
tive requirements on prospective candidates, but would list any group's
candidate by simple request; other states required a small number of sig-
natures on a petition-500 signatures was the most common require-
ment, and 1000 signatures the second most common.73 In 1924, only
50,000 signatures were required to place a new party on the ballot in
65. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,202 (1992) (citing ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY
OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1-6 (1917); JOSEPH P. HARRIS,
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (1934); JERROLD RUSK, THE EFFECT OF
THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT REFORM ON SPLIT TICKET VOTING: 1876-1908, 8-11 (1968)).
66. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. (citing SPENCER D. ALBRIGHT, THE AMERICAN BALLOT 14-20 (1942)).
70. Id. at 202.
71. Id. at 203.
72. Id.
73. See Winger, supra note 52, at 236.
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forty-eight states, a figure representing 0.15% of the number of people
who had voted in the previous election.7 4
Ballot access laws that imposed significant substantive require-
ments first arose in the twentieth century during the "red scare" that
swept the nation after World War I. The fear of infiltration was so great
that some states actually banned the Communist Party.75 But while the
red scare faded, ballot access laws imposing harsh substantive require-
ments on minor party and independent candidates proliferated. The most
pervasive requirement is the signature petition. Prior to 1936, no state
had ever required a candidate for president to submit more than 25,000
signatures to gain ballot access, and as late as 1948, the majority of states
still granted ballot access to any candidate who submitted as few as 500
to 1000 signatures.7 6 Today, however, many state petition requirements
are defined as a percentage of the state's registered or actual voters.
Oklahoma, for example, requires signatures from five percent of the vot-
ers in the last presidential or gubernatorial election.77 North Carolina re-
quires signatures from two percent of its registered voters; California,
Florida and Georgia require signatures from one percent of their regis-
tered voters.78 While these percentages appear minimal, the gross figures
represent a drastic increase in the number of signatures actually required:
today Oklahoma requires more than 73,000 signatures; California re-
quires more than 165,000; North Carolina and Florida require more than
100,000; and Georgia requires more than 40,000.7 9 The number of signa-
74. Richard Winger, The Importance of Ballot Access, LONG TERM VIEW (1994), reprinted in
BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/iba.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
75. D. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 92 (Brookings Instit. 1974).
76. See Winger, supra note 52, at 236; see also WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, THE RISE AND FALL
OF THIRD PARTIES 103 (Pub. Aff. Press 1948). Although nominally a history of minor parties in
America, Hesseltine's book is more accurately an exhortation, aimed at liberals, to found a new
political party. In this light, Hesseltine's observation that "[iln actual fact, [the] legal obstacles are
more apparent than real" is revealing, given the publication date of his book.
77. See Press Release, OKBallotChoice.org, No Openness in the House, Say Ballot Reformers
(2005), available at http://www.jmbzine.com/okballotchoice/news030305.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2005).
78. See MARKIN, supra note 53. A federal judge declared North Carolina's petition require-
ment for independent candidates unconstitutional in July 2004 because two percent of the number of
registered voters is a figure significantly larger than the requirement imposed on minor party candi-
dates, which is two percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial election. See DeLaney v. Bartlett,
370 F. Supp. 2d 373 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Legislation is apparently pending in North Carolina as a
result of this case.
79. See OKBallotChoice.org, supra note 77, for Oklahoma figures. Other signature require-
ments were derived from the number of registered voters in each state as of 2004. See North Caro-
lina State Bd. of Elections, Reports & Data, http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/indexdata.html (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005); California Secretary of State, Report of Registration, http://www.ss.ca.gov/
elections/ror/regstats 10 18 04.pdf (2004); Florida Secretary of State, County Registration by
Party, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voterreg/pdf/2004/2004genParty.pdf (2004); Georgia Secretary
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tures required to place a new party on the ballot in all fifty states today
approaches 1,000,000.80
Many states also limit the timeframe in which potential candidates
are permitted to collect petition signatures, and impose other limitations
on the manner in which signatures may be collected and who may collect
them.81 Texas, for example, prohibits primary voters from signing peti-
tions.82 Hawaii prohibits primary voters from "splitting" their tickets by
voting for candidates from more than one party, so that voters have a
strong incentive not to vote for a non-major party candidate. 83 In addi-
tion, each state establishes its own complex set of formal procedures
regulating details such as the size and type of paper on which signatures
may be collected, and the manner in which pages must be labeled and
numbered. These requirements, like the petition requirements them-
selves, invariably apply only to minor party and independent candi-
dates.84 The violation of any one of them is grounds for excluding pro-
spective candidates from the ballot-a decision that is made at the dis-
cretion of a partisan Secretary of State.
85
of State, Voter Registration and Gender by Month, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/voter_
registrationlmonthlyracegender.pdf (2005).
80. See 2004 Petitioning for President, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS 19 (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/0201.html#14 (listing petition requirements state by state); Brian
Faler, Census Details Voter Turnout for 2004, WASHINGTON POST, May 26, 2005, at A10,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/25/AR2005052501965
.html (reporting that 125 million Americans voted in the 2004 presidential election). Measured as a
percentage of the voters in the most recent election, the total petition requirement represents an
eight-fold increase over the 50,000 signature requirement of 1924; as a gross figure, today's petition
requirement represents a twenty-fold increase over the 1924 total.
81. See Winger, supra note 52 at 239; MARKIN, supra note 53.
82. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
83. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 671 (1998). Given the Democratic Party's practical
monopoly over Hawaii's electoral process, voters who cast a vote for a minor party or independent
candidate relinquish the right to vote for any other candidate in that election cycle.
84. See generally MARKIN, supra note 53. Major political parties are generally permitted to
field a candidate by virtue of their candidate's performance in the previous election, and are thereby
exempted from compliance with the laws' requirements for minor party and independent candidates.
85. In the 2004 presidential election, Oregon denied ballot access to independent presidential
candidate Ralph Nader because petition pages were "flawed" according to "unwritten rules" applied
by Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury. Four years previously, Nader received five percent of
the Oregon popular vote for president. See Charles Beggs, No Spot on Oregon Ballot for Nader,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 23, 2004, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/
192048 nader23.html. Pennsylvania denied Nader ballot access because petition papers included
fictitious names like "Mickey Mouse." See Susannah Rosenblatt, In PA., Fake Signatures Keep
Nader OffBallot, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at A13. IfNader had crossed these names out,
that would have excluded the entire page of signatures. See MARKIN, supra note 53, at PA-4 ("The
secretary is not to permit filing of the paper if it contains material errors or defects apparent on its
face, or ... if it contains material alterations made after signing without consent of the signers.").
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C. American Democracy and the Two-Party System
In the roughly thirty-five years since the first modem ballot access
case came before the Supreme Court,86 states have advanced two primary
interests to justify their various laws. The first is the interest in prevent-
ing voter confusion that might result from the appearance of too many
candidates on the ballot. The second is the interest in promoting the sta-
bility of the political system.87 The Court's uneven treatment of these
interests will be discussed in Part III below, but as a preliminary matter,
the interests are evaluated here on their own merits.
The state's interest in preventing voter confusion arises from the
possibility that a ballot could become overcrowded if the state were re-
quired to include every person who requested a listing. Although histori-
cally many states did just that, today the strategic behavior of modem
political parties renders this laissez-faire approach inadequate today.88
For example, a party might seek ballot listing for numerous candidates
with the same name as the rival party's candidate in an effort to confuse
voters who wish to vote for the rival candidate. Modem ballot access
requirements render such tactics obsolete in many states, but strategic
behavior remains a persistent threat to the integrity of elections. In April
2004, a Denver attorney and registered Democrat organized two new
political parties, the Pro-Life Party and the Gun Owners' Rights Party,
presumably in an effort to siphon votes from traditionally Republican
constituencies. Neither party actually nominated candidates for public
office, but they remain eligible to do so in 2006.89
If state regulation of the ballot is necessary to prevent voter confu-
MUtIII I LUUUy 6 PUIILInal U 5IOt, UlK, I U. lagt .I LIII L3 fttJ V Ifl. . -
tion is necessary. As late as 1995, many states imposed only minimal
requirements. Tennessee, for example, required only twenty-five signa-
tures to list an independent presidential candidate; Washington required
200; Utah required 300; Vermont and Rhode Island required 1000; and
Wisconsin required 2000.90 There is no indication that voters in these
states experienced greater confusion during the presidential election than
did voters in other states. 91 And with respect to statewide elections, no
86. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
87. See id. at 31-33.
88. See Winger, supra note 52, at 236, 245.
89. "'Fake" Parties in Colorado Abstain, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS 20 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/0901 .html# 18.
90. MARKIN, supra note 53.
91. In fact, the most infamous case of voter confusion in a presidential election occurred in
2000 in Florida, a state with some of the most restrictive ballot access requirements in the country;
the confusion arose not from a surfeit of candidates on the ballot but from the "butterfly" ballot's
poor design. See CNN INSIDE POLITICS, NEWSPAPER: BUTTERFLY BALLOT COST GORE WHITE
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state that required as few as 5000 signatures has ever listed more than
eight candidates on the ballot.92 While eight candidates approach the
point of overcrowding, the problem of overcrowding is clearly alleviated
by a reasonable signature requirement. As a Federal Elections Commis-
sioner recently conceded, "State laws regulating ballot access [are] far
more restrictive than any legitimate state interests would require., 93 If
preventing overcrowding and voter confusion is the goal, ballot access
requirements ought to be strict enough to render strategic behavior by
political parties unprofitable, but not so strict that the requirements rou-
tinely exclude otherwise legitimate candidates.
The second state interest advanced to justify ballot access laws-
the interest in promoting the stability of the political system-comes in
two varieties. In its strong form, the state asserts an interest in promoting
political stability by channeling all political activity into the two major
parties. In its weak form, the state asserts an interest in promoting politi-
cal stability through a two-party system, but not in channeling all politi-
cal activity into only two parties. The distinction is that the weak form
allows some role for minor parties to play in the two-party system. But
under either version, the state's interest is to avoid the proliferation of
minor parties by protecting the predominance of the two major parties.94
Both forms of the political stability argument are rooted in the no-
tion that presidential democracies require a two-party system in order to
function effectively, and only parliamentary democracies can function
effectively with multi-party systems. Under this view, gridlock would
likely result in a presidential democracy with a multi-party system be-
cause the president would lack support in a legislature comprised of
many different parties, and the legislature would be unable to remove the
president for anything but impeachable offenses. Thus, the tension be-
tween the executive and the legislature would produce a stalemate rather
than a system of checks and balances. In a parliamentary democracy, by
contrast, the legislature is likely to support the executive because parlia-
ment chooses the prime minister. Moreover, if the prime minister loses
HOUSE (Mar. 11, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/1 l/palmbeach
.recount.
92. See Ballot Crowding Chart, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS 20 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/0901 .html#4. New York is an exception, having had a ballot with
twelve names listed for one office at a time when the state's ballot access law required 15,000 signa-
tures. But New York allows "fusion" parties, in which the same person is listed on the ballot more
than once as the candidate of two or more parties, and this was the case on the ballot in question.
93. Smith, Regulation and the Decline of Grassroots Politics, supra note 53, at 5.
94. Thus, for example, states often advance the interest in political stability as justification for
limiting "sore loser" candidacies, wherein a candidate that loses one party's nomination seeks to run
as the nominee of another party. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351
(1997); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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that support, parliament can hold a vote of no confidence and appoint a
new prime minister. Thus, a parliamentary system can avert gridlock de-
spite the presence of multiple parties.95
Put simply, the political stability argument is that American democ-
racy requires a two-party system, and this justifies restrictive ballot ac-
cess laws that discriminate against minor party and independent candi-
dates. But the argument's conclusion does not follow from its premise.
The American political system has existed since the nation's founding,
long before restrictive and discriminatory ballot access laws were en-
acted. That system was not historically one in which only two parties
existed, but rather was one in which two major parties predominated over
several minor parties that actively participated in elections. 96 These mi-
nor parties played a limited but vital role in this system: limited because
minor parties were often short-lived, but vital because the minor parties
brought about change that the major parties often resisted.97 For example,
abolitionists formed the Liberty Party in 1840 when the major parties
refused to condemn slavery. In the 1870s, the Greenback Party was first
to promote a host of social reforms such as the eight-hour workday, the
curtailment of child labor, women's suffrage, and the graduated income
tax.
98
Even if minor parties did not play an important historical role in the
American two-party system, no evidence supports the conclusion that
modem ballot access laws are necessary to promote political stability in
the United States today. The United States enjoyed political stability for
most of its history before 1888, when the first ballot access laws were
enacted.99 And in the rare case in which a major party was displaced-
most recently when the Republicans replaced the Whigs in the mid- 19th
century-the two-party system remained stable. Moreover, in states
where ballot access laws only impose minimal requirements on minor
party and independent candidates, nothing suggests that the two-party
95. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult
Combination, DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 266 (MIT Press 2003). It should be noted, of course, that
Parliamentary democracies with multi-party systems do not necessarily function effectively. They
are able to because a mechanism exists for avoiding stalemate between the executive and legislative
branches, though they do not always reach this potential. t
96. See generally STEVEN ROSENSTONE, ROY BEHR, & EDWARD LAZARUS, THIRD PARTIES IN
AMERICA 49 (Princeton Univ. Press 1984); HESSELTINE, supra note 76.
97. ROSENSTONE, BEHR & LAZARUS, supra note 96, at 43-44. Minor parties tend to coalesce
around issues that the major parties ignore, and they tend to die when the major parties co-opt their
platforms.
98. See generally id at 63-67.
99. See Winger, supra note 52, at 236.
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system, or political stability in general, is threatened. 00 The reason for
this stability is that the two-party system is a function of structural fea-
tures of American democracy; on this fact there is virtually no dispute.'0'
Under the single-member-district plurality system that governs
American elections, particular candidates compete for particular offices,
and the candidate who obtains the most votes wins the office outright.
This type of electoral system is therefore popularly known as the "first-
past-the-post" system.' °2 In contrast to proportional representation sys-
tems, first-past-the-post systems provide no reward for second place.
Thus, minor party candidates have little incentive to compete, and if they
do compete despite the odds, the system discourages citizens from
"throwing their votes away" on a candidate who has no hope to win.'
0 3
The first-past-the-post system, therefore, not only discourages minor
party participation in the electoral system, but generally favors two-party
systems.10 4 The tendency for first-past-the-post systems to produce two
dominant parties is so well known, in fact, that it has a name: Duverger's
Law. 105
Duverger's Law does not explain why the same two parties pre-
dominate in American democracy, but other structural features do. First,
the presidential election system discourages regional parties, which
would not necessarily be discouraged by first-past-the-post systems.'
0 6
Second, the emergence of direct primary elections permits competition
within the major parties, reducing the incentive for those with new ideas
to form new political parties. 0 7 Taken together, these structural features
of American democracy virtually guarantee the persistence of the two-
party system. In fact, a study of 107 single-member-district plurality na-
tions showed that ninety percent had two-party systems. The exceptions
were countries with strong regional minor parties, but the United States'
presidential system discourages these parties.'0 8
100. See generally Richard Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should
Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 331,367-71 (1997).
101. Id.




105. See Daniel Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-and Be Thankful
for Small Favors, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 300
(Georgetown Univ. Press 2002).
106. Id. at 300-01.
107. Id.
108. See DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 93-95
(Yale Univ. Press 1971); Lowenstein, supra note 105.
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The American presidential system discourages regional minor par-
ties because the Electoral College system operates on a winner-take-all
basis. 10 9 The Electoral College therefore presents the same disincentive
to minor party presidential candidates and their supporters as the first-
past-the-post system does in every other election: the candidate that wins
the most popular votes in a state wins all of the state's Electoral College
votes. 01 Thus, minor party candidates, who rarely can hope to win a ma-
jority of the popular vote in any state, have little incentive to compete.
John Anderson, for example, polled 6.6% of the national popular vote for
president in 1980, but did not win a single Electoral College vote."'
Since no minor party can hope to compete in an electoral system that
makes it virtually impossible for its candidate to win the highest office in
the land, the Electoral College functions as a disincentive to minor par-
ties generally.
Given that the structural features of American democracy virtually
guarantee the persistence of the two-party system in the United States,
the state's interest in political stability offers little support for restrictive
ballot access laws that discriminate against minor party and independent
candidates. In fact, modem ballot access laws appear to be completely
superfluous as a means of protecting the two-party system, or any other
legitimate state interest. 1 2 The Supreme Court recognized this important
fact when it first heard a challenge to a modem ballot access law in
1968.1 13 Since then, however, the Court's increasing deference to states
has led it to uphold unnecessarily restrictive and discriminatory ballot
access laws precisely because they protect the two-party system.
III. BALLOT ACCESS IN THE MODERN ERA: WILLIAMS V. RHODES
The first minor party challenge to a modem ballot access law came
before the Supreme Court in 1968.1 14 In Williams v. Rhodes, the Ohio
American Independent Party challenged Ohio's statutory scheme, which
required new party candidates to submit 433,100 signatures by February
of an election year."15 Former Alabama Governor George Wallace, the
109. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2-3. The Constitutional provisions establishing the Electoral
College do not prescribe a winner-take-all system, but only two states-Nebraska and Maine-
divide their electoral votes proportionally.
110. See generally DAHL, supra note 102.
111. ROSENSTONE, BEHR & LAZARUS, supra note 96, at 17. See also discussion infra Part I.B.
112. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 83, at 680. See also Hasen, supra note 100.
113. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
114. The Court heard a challenge to Illinois' ballot access laws in 1948, but the Court rejected
the challenge and the case has not played a significant role in the Court's modem ballot access juris-
prudence. See MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
115. 393 U.S. 23.
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American Independent Party's presidential candidate, submitted more
than 450,000 valid signatures, but did so after the deadline passed, and
Ohio excluded him from the ballot. 16 The Court found that Ohio's statu-
tory scheme imposed a heavy burden on "two different, although over-
lapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regard-
less of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." '117 Be-
cause the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect these rights from
"encroachment" or "infringement" by the government, the Court applied
strict scrutiny and held Ohio's entire statutory scheme unconstitu-
tional.1 18
In Williams, the Court elaborated a robust conception of voting
rights characterized by two key features. 19 First, the Court distinguished
the right to vote as a mere procedural formality from the right to vote
effectively. 120 While the Court did not specify exactly what the right to
"vote effectively" entails, for present purposes this can be understood as
the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choosing. Second, the
Court noted that the right to vote effectively is interdependent with the
right to associate for political purposes, because the ability of voters to
exercise their rights is inextricably linked with the right of candidates to
exercise theirs by appearing on the ballot.' 21 As the Court explained:
The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus
denied an equal opportunity to win votes. So also, the right to vote
is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two par-
ties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the
ballot. 1
22
Thus, the Court found that Ohio's statutory scheme burdened the rights
of both voters and candidates, because it gave Republican and Democ-
ratic candidates "a permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote
for or against them."'
123
116. Wallace's 450,000 signatures were almost certainly all valid because Ohio did not require
signers to be registered voters in 1968, and duplicates had been eliminated from the petition. Inter-
view with Richard Winger, Editor, Ballot Access News, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 26, 2005). Re-
gardless, Wallace's signatures were presumptively valid, because the only basis advanced for ex-
cluding Wallace from the ballot was his failure to meet the deadline. See Williams, 393 U.S. 23.
117. Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.
118. Id. at 32.
119. Id. at 30-31.
120. Id. at 30.
121. Id. at 31.
122. Id. at 31.
123. Id. at 32.
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Having identified a substantial burden on constitutional rights, the
Court's Equal Protection analysis consisted primarily of a searching in-
quiry into, and ultimate rejection of, the State's justification for its statu-
tory scheme. Most notably, the Court rejected the State's interest in pro-
moting political stability through a two-party system, reasoning that the
law did not promote a two-party system, but rather promoted two parties
in particular.' 24 The Court also rejected the State interest in preventing
voter confusion, which might result if too many candidates qualified for
the ballot. 125 The Court found that this had never happened in Ohio be-
fore the adoption of the challenged regulations, nor had it ever happened
in other states that required relatively few signatures from candidates
seeking ballot access.' 26 Thus, the Court rejected voter confusion as "no
more than theoretically imaginable," and held it insufficient to justify
"the immediate and crippling impact on the basic constitutional rights
involved."'
127
The Court made clear that ballot access laws that applied differently
to different groups would be subject to strict scrutiny: "In determining
whether the State has power to place such unequal burdens on minority
groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court
have consistently held that 'only a compelling state interest ... can jus-
tify limiting First Amendment freedoms.' 128
Central to the Court's finding of an unequal burden was the fact
that Ohio's laws effectively granted major party candidates automatic
ballot access by virtue of their party's performance in the previous elec-
tion. 129 Thus, Ohio's signature requirement applied only to "new parties
struggling for existence," and gave "the two old, established parties a
decided advantage." 130 The State argued that its interests in ensuring ma-
jority rather than plurality election winners, as well as preventing party
factionalism, justified the requirement.' 3 1 The Court rejected the argu-
ment not because the interests were not important, but because they
could not be achieved without imposing an impermissible burden on the
rights of new parties.' 
32
124. Id.
125. Id. at 33.
126. Id.
127. Id. ("Ohio claims that its highly restrictive provisions are justified because without them a
large number of parties might qualify for the ballot, and the voters would then be confronted with a
choice so confusing that the popular will could be frustrated.").
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 32.
132. Id. at 32-33.
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Williams was decided at the height of the civil rights era, and came
at the end of a string of cases in which the Court struck down a variety of
state laws infringing the right to vote.' 33 In 1960, the Court found that an
Alabama law redefining the city boundaries of Tuskegee was a device to
disenfranchise blacks in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment because it
changed "the shape of Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth twenty-
eight-sided figure" which removed from the city "all save four or five of
its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resi-
dent."' 34 In 1962, the Court found that black voters had standing to chal-
lenge Tennessee's apportionment of seats in the state's General Assem-
bly because the apportionment caused the voters "debasement of their
votes" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 35 In 1964, the Court ordered Alabama to reapportion its voting
districts on similar grounds. 36 In 1965, the Court upheld the Voting
Rights Act, which prohibits states from enacting regulations or qualifica-
tions on the right to vote that have the purpose or effect "of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.' 37 In 1969, the
Court held that a law requiring that signatures on a petition be spread
evenly across counties violated the principle of "one man, one vote.'' 38
These cases all give content to the Williams Court's distinction be-
tween the right to vote and the right to vote effectively. Each represents
an instance in which the right to vote effectively, as opposed to the right
to vote as a mere procedural formality, imposed a limit on state regula-
tory power. The Williams Court specifically rejected the State's assertion
of absolute power to regulate elections: the Constitution grants states
regulatory power, the Court acknowledged, but "always subject to the
limitation that [it] may not be exercised in a way that violates other spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution."' 39 Thus, the Court held Ohio's en-
tire statutory scheme unconstitutional not because it prevented people
from voting, but because it undermined their right to vote effectively.
Viewed in its immediate historical context, Williams can be under-
stood as one more case in which the civil rights era Court, under the
133. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
134. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342.
135. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187.
136. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533.
137.42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2004); See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
138. Moore, 394 U.S. at 818-19.
139. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968). In Williams, the State's power was
granted by Article 11, Section 1, which provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." to choose a President and Vice President.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § I.
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leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, protected minority voting rights
from infringement by the states. Certainly the Court was aware that states
had used ballot access laws in the past to exclude racial minorities from
an election, 40 and that they had engaged in more insidious efforts to
achieve the same end without taking official state action. 41 But the
Court's decisions in the 1960s were concerned primarily with state action
that undermined minority voting rights by counting minority votes in a
way that diminished their value. 142 In Williams, the Court was concerned
with state action that undermined the rights of all voters by excluding
candidates from the ballot and narrowing voters' choices. Unlike the
other civil rights era cases, the facts in Williams did not suggest an
overtly racial dimension. Nevertheless, Williams' association with these
cases may explain why it has turned out to be anomalous in the Court's
ballot access jurisprudence. Whatever the explanation, Williams has not
been followed; in subsequent ballot access decisions, the Court has ex-
hibited a tendency toward non-intervention and a deference to state legis-
lative judgments that contrasts markedly with its decision in Williams.
A. Distinguishing Williams: Jenness v. Fortson
The Court's next ballot access case came three years after Williams,
in 1971. In Jenness v. Fortson,143 the Georgia Socialist Workers Party
candidates for Governor and the House of Representatives, together with
voters, sued in a class action on behalf of themselves and "all other regis-
tered voters in the State of Georgia desirous of having an opportunity to
consider persons on the ballot other than nominees of the Democratic
and Republican parties." 144 The Court did not specify the standard of re-
view it applied, but it gave scant consideration to the constitutional rights
central to its opinion in Williams. 45 Nor did the Court inquire into the
state interests asserted to justify Georgia's statutory scheme. Instead, the
Court simply compared Georgia's statutory scheme with Ohio's in an
effort to distinguish Williams by showing that Georgia's scheme, unlike
Ohio's, allowed minor party candidates a realistic possibility to gain bal-
lot access and thus did not "operate to freeze the status quo.'
146
140. See Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
141. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
142. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
143. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
144. Id. at 433 n.3.
145. Id. at 438.
146. Id.
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The apparent differences between the Ohio and Georgia statutory
schemes, which the Court emphasized in upholding the Georgia scheme,
are not as dramatic as the Court suggested.147 Most notably, the Court
compared the signature requirements of each state, suggesting that Geor-
gia's five percent requirement was more reasonable than Ohio's fifteen
percent requirement. 48 But here, the Court was comparing apples and
oranges: Georgia required signatures from five percent of the eligible
voters in the previous election, whereas Ohio required fifteen percent of
the actual voters in the previous election. An unfortunate fact of every
election is that the pool of eligible voters is always far greater than the
pool of actual voters. Thus, Georgia's five percent requirement was
much greater than the Court evidently realized. In fact, Georgia required
the plaintiff Jenness to collect 88,175 signatures-significantly fewer
than Ohio's requirement of 433,100 signatures, but still five times that of
forty-two states, and at least fifty times that of sixteen states.
In light of Georgia's restrictive signature requirement, the differ-
ences the Court noted between the Ohio and Georgia statutory schemes
meant relatively little. Because Georgia's signature requirement was in-
dependently sufficient to exclude candidates, it hardly mattered whether
candidates could fulfill the other requirements. In fact, Georgia's signa-
ture requirement was particularly onerous because, unlike Ohio, which
allowed one signature to count for a party's entire slate of candidates,
Georgia required the same person to sign fourteen different petitions to
qualify a party's entire slate. 149 Nevertheless, the bulk of the Court's
short opinion was devoted to distinguishing Georgia's statutory scheme
from Ohio's on the basis of requirements other than the signature peti-
tion. Thus, the Court noted that Ohio prohibited write-in voting, but
Georgia did not; Ohio prohibited independent candidacies, but Georgia
did not (and in fact, Ohio only prohibited independent candidates for
president, but not for any other office); 50 Ohio's petition deadline was
unreasonably early, but Georgia's was not; and Ohio required all parties
to hold primaries, but Georgia did not.' 5'
Whether or not the Jenness Court underestimated the burden Geor-
gia's scheme imposed, its analytic approach has been more important to
the development of the law. In contrast to the Court's scrutiny and rejec-
tion of the state interests advanced to justify Ohio's statutory scheme in
147. See Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights, supra note 53, at 183; Winger,
supra note 52, at 235.
148. Winger, supra note 52, at 439.
149. See Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights, supra note 53, at 183.
150. See Winger, supra note 52.
151. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438.
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Williams, in Jenness, the Court accepted a generalized state interest in
regulating the ballot without further inquiry. The Court in Jenness de-
voted only one conclusory line to the subject:
There is surely an important state interest in requiring some pre-
liminary showing of a significant modicum of support before print-
ing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot-
the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even
frustration of the democratic process at the general election.
152
The point is undoubtedly correct, but sidesteps the crucial issue of what
constitutes "a significant modicum of support" without imposing an im-
permissible burden. As the Court noted in Williams, "the experience of
many states ... demonstrates that no more than a handful of parties at-
tempts to qualify for ballot positions even when a very low number of
signatures, such as one percent of the electorate, is required."1 53 In fact,
Georgia itself was one of those states: since it started printing official
ballots in 1922, Georgia has never had more than six candidates on the
ballot for any statewide election.
54
The Court's refusal to inquire into alternatives implies a formalistic
dichotomy the Court would invoke explicitly in subsequent cases: that
the state faces a choice between the challenged statutory scheme and
chaos. The refusal to inquire into alternatives also reflects a shift in the
Court's equal protection analysis to a minimal standard of review. Under
Williams, a ballot access law violates equal protection where it imposes
substantially unequal burdens on new parties and cannot be justified even
by a compelling state interest. Under Jenness, however, ballot access
laws are upheld as long as they do not "operate to freeze the political
status quo.' 55 Williams held that Ohio's statutory scheme violated equal
protection by granting the old, established parties automatic ballot access
while requiring new parties to collect hundreds of thousands of signa-
tures. The Court in Jenness, faced with the same statutory structure im-
posing a significantly unequal burden, nevertheless found no equal pro-
tection violation:
From the point of view of one who aspires to elective public office
in Georgia, alternative routes are available to getting his name
printed on the ballot. He may enter the primary of a political party,
or he may circulate nominating petitions either as an independent
candidate or under the sponsorship of a political organization. We
152. Id. at 442.
153. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968).
154. Winger, supra note 52, at 238.
155. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438.
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cannot see how Georgia has violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by making available these two alterna-
tive paths, neither of which can be assumed to be inherently more
burdensome than the other.
1 56
Under Jenness, no equal protection violation exists where a candidate
may choose to seek the nomination of a political party, thereby gaining
automatic ballot access, or to collect 88,175 signatures in hope of gaining
ballot access as a minor party. Georgia law, however, defines "political
party" so that only the Republicans and Democrats qualify. 157 Candidates
who do not wish to register as a Republican or Democrat thus have no
alternative but to circulate nominating petitions. The Court's finding that
this statutory scheme does not violate equal protection cannot be recon-
ciled with Williams, which invalidated Ohio's signature requirement pre-
cisely because it applied only to "new parties struggling for existence,"
and gave "the two old, established parties a decided advantage.
158
The Court's effort in Jenness to distinguish Williams constituted the
bulk of the opinion, but Jenness essentially overruled Williams.159 After
Jenness, the Court no longer applied strict scrutiny in ballot access cases,
although it purported to do so in the two cases that immediately fol-
lowed.1 60 The state interests that the Court scrutinized and rejected in
Williams it later accepted as legitimate without inquiry. One predictable
result is that states appear to have taken notice: in the first fifteen years
after Jenness, seventeen states raised their signature requirements for
minor party candidates-more than had raised them in the preceding
thirty years.
16 1
B. Ballot Access Jurisprudence after Jenness
Three years after Jenness, the Court decided Storer v. Brown, a case
it characterized as falling between the extremes of Williams and Jen-
ness.162 In Storer, two Communist Party members sought listings on
156. Id. at 440-41.
157. Under Georgia law, a political party is any party that polled at least twenty percent of the
vote in the previous gubernatorial or presidential election. See id. at 433.
158. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
159. See Jenness, 403 U.S. at 434-42.
160. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974).
161. See Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights, supra note 53, at 187. The seven-
teen states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Virginia.
162. Storer, 415 U.S. 724. This survey omits American Party of Texas, which the Court de-
cided on the same day, because Storer concerns substantially similar issues. In American Party of
Texas, the Court upheld Texas' statutory scheme regulating ballot access against an equal protection
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California's ballot as independent candidates for President and Vice-
President. Two members of another party joined the litigation, seeking
ballot access as independent candidates for Congress. The candidates
challenged California statutory restrictions on independent candidates.
The challenged provisions forbade ballot listing to independent candi-
dates who had been registered with a political party within one year of
the primary election; required independent candidates to submit signa-
tures of five percent of the total number of voters in the previous general
election; prohibited primary voters from signing petitions; and limited
the time in which signatures could be collected to a 24-day period fol-
lowing the primary. 163 The Court struck down the provision preventing
non-partisan primary voters from signing petitions, upheld the others,
and remanded to the District Court to determine "whether . . . the
325,000-signature requirement, to be satisfied in 24 days, is too great a
burden."'
64
The Court acknowledged that the California statute required inde-
pendent candidates to gather more than 13,500 signatures per day for 24
days straight, but concluded that this requirement did not "appear to be
an impossible burden. 165 The Court remanded the issue only to deter-
mine whether 325,000 signatures, measured as a proportion of eligible
signers after the exclusion of primary voters from the pool, was unconsti-
tutionally burdensome. 66 As the dissent pointed out, however, this in-
formation was already available with respect to the candidates for Con-
gress. If primary voters were excluded from the pool, then 325,000 sig-
natures was equal to 9.5% of those eligible to sign-a figure nearly twice
that required by the Georgia statute in Jenness. 167
In Storer, the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, but an often-
cited passage suggests a more deferential standard at work. 168 "There
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
challenge on the ground that it did not operate to freeze the status quo, but struck down a provision
excluding minor party and independent candidates from absentee ballots. American Party of Texas,
415 U.S. 767.
163. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27.
164. Id. at 740.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The total number of registered voters on September
14, 1972-the last day appellants were permitted to file nomination petitions-was 9,953,124 ... Of
that number, 6,460,220 registered voters could not sign petitions because they had voted in the 1972
primary elections ... Thus, the total pool of registered voters available to appellants was reduced to
approximately 3,492,904, of which the required 331,670 signatures was 9.5%." (citations omitted)).
168. See id. at 729-33; American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974) (holding
that the validity of a state's statutory scheme regulating ballot access "depends upon whether they
are necessary to further compelling state interests").
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honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic processes," the Court observed, explicitly invoking the di-
chotomy implicit in Jenness. As in Jenness, in Storer the Court failed to
inquire into less burdensome alternatives. 169 But the Court's deference in
Storer went one step beyond Jenness, accepting as valid justification the
same state interests specifically rejected in Williams. The Court cited
both Williams and Jenness for the proposition that states have a legiti-
mate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot, and
concluded, "the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the
clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that
the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of
those voting."'170 Williams hardly stands as authority for this statement:
Williams rejected the last interest as impermissible per se, rejected voter
confusion as a mere theoretical possibility, and never addressed the clog-
ging of machinery.1
71
Storer's treatment of voting rights is difficult to reconcile with Wil-
liams. The Court's concept of voting rights in Williams was character-
ized by its distinction between the right to vote and the right to vote ef-
fectively, and by its recognition that the associational rights of voters and
candidates are separate but interdependent. 172 In Storer, by contrast, the
Court altogether failed to distinguish these rights, holding that a citizen
who votes in a party primary thereby relinquishes the right to sign a peti-
tion for another candidate. 173 This suggests that the rights are mutually
exclusive, but a voter who supports a particular candidate does not relin-
quish the right to hear other candidates in an election. By the same token,
a minor party candidate in a general election has the right to solicit sup-
port from every voter--even those who voted in a party primary. As the
Court recognized in Williams, all voters, regardless of party affiliation,
benefit from the participation of minor party candidates in a two-party
system. 
74
169. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I have searched in vain for even the
slightest evidence in the records of these cases of any effort on the part of the State to demonstrate
the absence of reasonably less burdensome means of achieving its objectives.").
170. Id. at 732.
171. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1968).
172. Id.
173. Storer, 415 U.S. at 741.
174. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 39 ("In our political life, third parties are often important chan-
nels through which political dissent is aired: 'All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled
into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity
by minority, dissident groups, which innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic
thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted .... The absence of such voices would be a
symptom of grave illness in our society."' (quoting Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-
51 (1957)).
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The next important ballot access case came a decade later, when the
Court decided Anderson v. Celebrezze in 1983.175 The case came before
the Court after Ohio denied ballot listing to John Anderson, an independ-
ent candidate for President in the 1980 election. Anderson satisfied
Ohio's substantive requirement by submitting 14,500 signatures on May
16, 1980, but Ohio's Secretary of State refused the petition because the
deadline was March 20th of that year. 176 The issue before the Court was
whether Ohio's March deadline imposed an unconstitutional burden on
the voting and associational rights of Anderson and his supporters. 177
In Anderson, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that ballot ac-
cess laws necessarily trigger strict scrutiny. 17 Instead, the Court articu-
lated a balancing test to determine the appropriate standard of review.179
Under this test, the Court weighs "the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed
by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights."180 Strict scrutiny ap-
plies under this test only if the rule imposes a severe burden to the plain-
tiff's rights. But where the rule imposes "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions," a more deferential standard of review applies, under which
"the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to jus-
tify" the restrictions.181
The Court struck down Ohio's March deadline, holding that the
deadline impermissibly burdened the associational rights of independent
candidates and their supporters and violated the Equal Protection Clause
by burdening independents more than major party candidates. 182 Within
the context of a presidential election, the Court reasoned, Ohio's deadline
implicated an important national interest because it restricted voting in
one state, which would affect voting in other states. 183 The Court consid-
175. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). This survey omits Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party because the case has been relatively unimportant to the development of the Court's ballot
access jurisprudence. Illinois State Bd. of Elections involved an equal protection challenge, under
which the Court struck down a provision of the Illinois statutory scheme regulating ballot access that
required candidates for office in Chicago to collect significantly more signatures than candidates for
statewide office. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
176. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786-87.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 788.
179. Id. at 789.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 788.
182. Id. at 806.
183. Id. at 794-95.
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ered and rejected three interests advanced by the state to justify the dead-
line-most notably, the Court rejected the state's interest in "political
stability" as amounting to a desire to protect the existing political parties
from competition from independent candidates.18 4 While Anderson sug-
gested a renewed willingness to intervene in ballot access cases, the test
the Court articulated has yet to trigger strict scrutiny because the Court
has found the requisite burden on constitutional rights lacking.
185
In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, decided in 1986, the Socialist
Workers Party challenged Washington's ballot access laws, which re-
quired that a candidate receive one percent of the primary vote in order
to be placed on the general ballot.' 86 Citing Anderson, the Court applied a
minimal standard of review and held that the burden on the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights did not outweigh the state's interest in restricting
access to the ballot. "Associational rights are not absolute and are neces-
sarily subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly and effec-
tively," the Court observed, while noting Storer's dichotomy between
state regulation and chaos.187 As in Storer, the Court in Munro accepted
the interests specifically rejected in Williams, but took deference to the
state one step further: in Munro, the Court held that the state need not
show its asserted interests have any basis in actual fact:
To require States to prove actual voter confusion, ballot overcrowd-
ing, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a predicate to the
imposition of reasonable ballot access restrictions would invariably
lead to endless court battles over the sufficiency of the evidence
.... Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to po-
tential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than
reactively. 188
Once again, the Court employed a formalistic dichotomy, this time be-
tween endless court battles and total deference to the legislative judg-
ment with respect to state interests. The Court suggested that any alterna-
tive "would necessitate that a State's political system sustain some level
of damage before the legislature could take corrective action."' 89 But a
state's political system could surely survive a minimal standard requiring
184. Id. at 802-07. The other two interests were promoting voter education by providing voters
a longer period in which to evaluate candidates, and promoting equal protection, since the deadline
was the same for all candidates.
185. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN, & RICHARD PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY 421 (Foundation Press 1998) (suggesting that the Court does not follow Anderson
because few state laws would withstand scrutiny under its test).
186. 479 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1986).
187. Id. at 193 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
188. Id. at 195.
189. Id.
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
that state interests have a basis in actual fact. And as the Williams Court
recognized, excessive deference to state legislative judgments can also
endanger the political system. 190 Nevertheless, the deference the Court
exhibited in Munro set the stage for two cases decided in the next decade
which, taken together, threaten to choke off all competition from minor
party and independent candidates, enabling the two old, established par-
ties to achieve the monopoly that the Court sought to prevent in Wil-
liams.
In 1992, the Court decided Burdick v. Takushi, a case in which it
upheld Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting. 19' Perhaps the appel-
lant's choice of candidate detracted from his claim, for the Court sug-
gested that writing in Donald Duck took the right to vote to an absurd
extreme. 192 The function of the electoral process is not primarily "a
means of giving vent to short-range political goals, pique, or personal
quarrels," the Court observed. 193 Citing Anderson, the Court applied
minimal review, finding that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting imposed
"only a limited burden on voters' rights to make free choices and to as-
sociate politically through the vote."'
194
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the ban im-
posed a significant burden on voters not because it deprived them of the
right to vote for Donald Duck, but because it deprived them of the right
to vote for the candidate of their choice. 195 This was particularly true in
Hawaii, which prohibits "split-ticket" voting-wherein voters vote for
candidates from different parties in different elections. Because the De-
mocratic Party dominates the Hawaiian primary process, a voter who
votes for a non-Democratic candidate for one office is likely to be pre-
cluded from voting in any other election.196 In light of this result, Ken-
nedy observed, Hawaii's elections had a "haunting similarity" to "sham
elections in which the name of the ruling party candidate [is] the only
one on the ballot."'
' 97
Kennedy reminded the Court that all elections in the United States
were conducted by write-in vote until voter harassment and intimidation
190. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-34 (1968) (addressing the pervasive damage to
the political system resulting from its monopolization by the two major parties).
191. 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992).
192. Id. at 437-38.
193. Id. at 438.
194. Id. at 439.
195. Id. at 444.
196. Id. at 443-45.
197. Id. at 444. Hawaii's prohibition on "split tickets," in which the same voter votes for can-
didates from different parties, means that a voter who votes for any non-Democratic candidate must
choose between doing so and participating in what will be the dispositive election for many offices.
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made official ballots necessary.198 Moreover, Kennedy argued, write-in
voting plays a critical role in modem elections as a baseline protection of
the right to vote effectively. 99 Write-in voting enables voters to express
dissatisfaction with the candidates on the ballot by rejecting those candi-
dates and voting for a candidate of their choice, or to react to late-
breaking news in a campaign.2 00 Nevertheless, in Burdick, the Court held
for the first time that a state could limit voters' choices in an election to a
preset field of candidates.20 1
The Court's rationale in Burdick is a model of consistency and, in
keeping with precedent, the Court's deferential posture caused it to side-
step the crucial issue. "Voting is of the most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure," the Court observed.20 2 But, citing
Munro, the Court continued, "it does not follow.., that the right to vote
in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes through
the ballot are absolute." 20 3 The Court did not explain why write-in voting
is tantamount to an "absolute" right to vote, but noted instead the states'
constitutional power to regulate elections and, citing Storer, recalled the
chaos that would result in the absence of state regulation.20 4 However,
apart from the holding, the Court never addressed the particular issue of
whether state regulatory power includes the power to ban write-in voting.
The Court's most recent ballot access case was decided in 1997.205
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Political Party, the Court upheld
Minnesota's ban on "fusion" parties, or separate parties that nominate the
same candidate.20 6 The Timmons Court found that the ban imposed only a
minor burden on the new party's associational rights because the candi-
date it favored was already on the ballot, and only slightly burdened its
198. ld. at 446-48.
199. See id. at 446. Ohio's ban on write-in voting weighed heavily into the Court's holding in
Williams that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35-
36 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Ohio, through an entangling web of election laws, has effec-
tively foreclosed its presidential ballot to all but Republicans and Democrats. It has done so initially
by abolishing write-in votes so as to restrict candidacy to names on the ballot; it has eliminated all
independent candidates through a requirement that nominees enjoy the endorsement of a political
party; it has defined "political party" in such a way as to exclude virtually all but the two major
parties.").
200. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 444-45.
201. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 185, at 352.
202. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).
203. Id. at 433.
204. Id.
205. This survey omits Norman v. Reed. In Norman, the Court held that Illinois could not deny
a party the use of its name on the assumption that it lacked the requisite permission from the party
founders, nor could the state deny the party's entire slate of candidates ballot access just because
some of the candidates failed to qualify. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
206. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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political speech because the primary purpose of a ballot is to elect candi-
dates, not to provide a forum for political speech.2 °7 Citing Anderson, the
Court applied minimal scrutiny.20 8 "We have repeatedly upheld reason-
able, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling ex-
pressive activities at the polls," the Court observed. 20 9 However, it was
the Court's opinion with respect to regulations that are not "politically
neutral" that broke new ground. In Timmons, the Court made clear for
the first time that favoring the two major parties is a legitimate state in-
terest that justifies regulation of the ballot.
210
"American politics has been organized around two parties since the
time of Andrew Jackson," the Court observed in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. 211 "The Constitution permits the ... Legislature to decide
that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party sys-
tem., 21 2 What the Court failed to mention was that ballot access laws
favoring the two-party system are a modem invention, and that the two-
party system was perfectly stable before these laws ever existed. 213 The
two-party system is stable even in states that have not enacted laws dis-
criminating against minor party and independent candidates. The Court
also neglected to mention that the legislature's decision in such cases is
self-interested.214 The Court effectively held that Republicans and De-
mocrats, by virtue of being older, have a greater claim to the constitu-
tional rights that Williams protected for all citizens "regardless of their
political persuasion. 215
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CANDIDATES' RIGHTS
The Court's retreat from Williams has resulted in a confused body
of law that is difficult and perhaps impossible to reconcile. Moreover, the
central question that ballot access cases present remains unresolved:
what limits do candidates' rights place upon state power to regulate the
ballot? Since Williams, the Court has repeatedly upheld ballot access
laws that infringe candidates' rights, while saying little about what limits
those rights impose upon state power. The result is that states today may
207. Id. at 363-66.
208. Id. at 358.
209. Id. at 369 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437-38).
210. Id. at 369-70.
211. Id. at 367.
212. Id.
213. See generally Winger, supra note 52, at 236.
214. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 57 (stating that "the importance of
party control in legislatures cannot be overstated. If one party controls both chambers of a legisla-
ture, they can use their majorities to shape policy in line with party philosophy.").
215. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.30 (1968).
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enact laws that discriminate according to party status and impose signifi-
cantly unequal burdens on minor party and independent candidates;
2 16
they can do so without advancing any facts to support the need to impose
those burdens; 2 17 they can do so for the explicit purpose of excluding
minor party and independent candidates; 218 and states can even bar those
candidates who have been excluded from running as write-in candi-
dates2 9
In light of this precedent, the deferential standards the Court has ar-
ticulated-that states may not enact laws that operate to freeze the status
quo 220 or impose impossible burdens 22 '-lack practical force. In Georgia,
for example, no minor party or independent candidate has ever fulfilled
the requirements to be placed on the ballot for the U.S. House since the
state increased them in 1943.222 Yet Georgia is the very state in which
Jenness originated to challenge those requirements, and where the Court
upheld them because they did not operate to freeze the status quo.
223
Since 1964, no independent candidate for the U.S. House has ever
achieved ballot listing in North Carolina or South Carolina, either. 224 In
fact, only four candidates for the U.S. House have ever overcome a sig-
nature requirement of greater than 10,000 to achieve ballot listing.
2 25
Signature requirements many times greater than 10,000 therefore impose
a burden that appears to be practically impossible.2 26
The primary legal obstacle facing minor party and independent
candidates who challenge such requirements on equal protection grounds
216. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
217. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
218. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
219. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
220. See Jenness, 403 U.S. 431.
221. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
222. Voter Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1941, 108th Cong. (2003).
223. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433 n.3.
224. See Voter Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1941, 108th Cong. (2003).
225. Id.
226. See id. This bill, H.R. 1941 of the 108th Congress, which was introduced by Rep. Ron
Paul (R - TX) but never enacted, would have provided ballot access to any candidate for the U.S.
House who submitted 1000 signatures and complied with the Act's other requirements. Currently,
Georgia requires independent candidates for the U.S. House to submit signatures equal in number to
five percent of the registered voters. North Carolina requires signatures equal in number to four
percent of the registered voters. South Carolina requires 10,000 signatures. In the November 2004
election, 4,951,955 Georgians were registered to vote. An independent candidate for the U.S. House
from Georgia therefore must collect nearly 247,597 signatures to achieve ballot access. See Georgia
Secretary of State, Voter Registration Figures for Georgia, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/acrobat/
Elections/voter registration history.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). North Carolina had 5,519,992
registered voters in 2004. An independent candidate for the U.S. House from North Carolina there-
fore must collect 220,799 signatures to achieve ballot access. See North Carolina State Board of
Elections, NC Voter Registration, http://www.sboe.state.nc.us (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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is the Court's unwillingness to recognize these candidates as a class that
227merits equal protection. No court would uphold the unequal burdens
many state laws impose if the laws discriminated according to race or
gender. But because the Court does not recognize minor party and inde-
pendent candidates as a class that merits equal protection, states are free
to impose significantly unequal burdens on these candidates under the
guise of impartial procedural regulation. In Jenness, for example, the
Court upheld Georgia's ballot access scheme, which imposed signifi-
cantly unequal burdens on minor party and independent candidates,
based on its finding that these candidates could run as major party candi-
dates. 228 But if minor party and independent candidates merit equal pro-
tection as a class, they should not have to become major party candidates
to avoid an unequal burden, and a law that discriminates against them is
unconstitutional whether or not they have this option.
The Court, of course, has held otherwise in numerous ballot access
cases. 229 Sometimes, as in Jenness, the Court entirely fails to recognize
minor party and independent candidates as a class. 3 ° The Court has up-
held laws that impose unequal burdens based on its finding in Anderson
that, "the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 23' In other cases, the
Court has recognized minor party and independent candidates as a class,
but refuses to hold that the unequal burden imposed upon them violates
the Equal Protection Clause.232 Presumably, in these cases the Court re-
227. See discussion supra Part Ill.
228. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 440-41. Candidates in Georgia had two options to
achieve ballot listing. They could win the nomination of one of the major parties, or they could col-
lect 88,175 signatures. The Court concluded, "We cannot see how Georgia has violated the Equal
Protection Clause . . .by making available these two alternative paths, neither of which can be as-
sumed to be inherently more burdensome than the other." Id.
229. The Court has struck down ballot access laws on equal protection grounds since Williams,
but such cases are the exception. For example, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Work-
ers Party, the Court struck down a law that required candidates in a mayoral election to collect more
signatures than candidates running for statewide office. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). And in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court struck down Ohio's
March deadline for submitting signature petitions, holding that it burdened independents more than
major party candidates. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
230. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 440-41.
231. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Worker's Party,
479 U.S. 189 (1986); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Political Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). Each of these cases relies on Anderson as a basis for upholding
laws that impose unequal burdens on minor party and independent candidates.
232. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). Although California granted major party
candidates for President automatic ballot listing while requiring independent candidates to collect
325,000 signatures in twenty-four days, the Court was unwilling on these facts to find an equal pro-
tection violation. "Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days would not appear to be an
impossible burden," the Court found, and remanded for a determination whether the signature re-
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lied on its finding in Williams that the Equal Protection Clause is directed
only at "invidious" classifications.233 But in Williams, the Court held
Ohio's ballot access scheme did violate the Equal Protection Clause, be-
cause it discriminated against new parties and gave the two old, estab-
lished parties a decided advantage.234
Although the Court has retreated from Williams in subsequent bal-
lot access cases, the Court has reaffirmed that discrimination against a
class of candidates is unconstitutional in two recent cases arising under
the Qualifications Clauses. In US. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court
struck down an amendment to the Arkansas state constitution that pro-
hibited the name of any candidate from appearing on the ballot who had
already served three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives or two
terms in the U.S. Senate.235 The Court held that the amendment violated
the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution, because those clauses ex-
clusively determine the qualifications for members of Congress, and
states may not add further qualifications under the guise of procedural
regulation.236 Distinguishing the "broad power to set qualifications from
the limited authority [granted to states] under the Elections Clause," the
Court found that the Elections Clause only grants states "authority to is-
sue procedural regulations ... [but not] to dictate electoral outcomes, to
favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitu-
tional restraints.
',237
The Court reaffirmed that states may not "favor or disfavor a class
of candidates" in Cook v. Gralike.238 In Gralike, a state was again en-
gaged in an effort to promote term limits. This time, an amendment to
Missouri's state constitution directed the state's congressional represen-
tatives to "use all their powers" to pass a term limits amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.239 The state amendment provided that if candidates
refused, a notification would appear next to their names on the ballot in-
dicating that the candidates either "disregarded voters' instructions" or
quirement amounted to a higher percentage of the pool of eligible signors than the Court had ap-
proved in Jenness.
233. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (citing the following as examples of
invidious discrimination: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriages prohibited);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" public education facilities);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially neutral law enforced in racially discriminatory
manner)).
234. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-34.
235. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
236. Id. at 838. The Qualifications Clauses are located in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and art.
I, § 3, cl. 3.
237. Id. at 833-34.
238. 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001).
239. Id. at 514.
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"declined to pledge to support term limits. '240 Noting that the Elections
Clause authorized states to enact "procedural" regulations only, the Court
observed that this power included choosing a time and place for holding
elections, as well as matters like "notices, registration, supervision of
voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,
counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and
publication of election returns." 241 But the Missouri amendment, the
Court found, "simply is not authorized by the Elections Clause. 242 The
Court found the amendment was not procedural, but an attempt to disfa-
vor a class of candidates, and held it unconstitutional.243
Thornton and Gralike thus stand in sharp contrast to the Court's
ballot access jurisprudence. In these Qualifications Clause cases, the
Court struck down laws precisely because the laws disfavored a class of
candidates. But in its ballot access jurisprudence, the Court routinely up-
holds laws that disfavor minor party and independent candidates. The
Court's finding that minor party and independent candidates do not merit
equal protection as a class is implicit in the holding of earlier ballot ac-
cess cases like Jenness and Storer, which sustained significantly unequal
burdens on these candidates. 244 The Court finally made this finding ex-
plicit in Timmons, when it declared that states may enact laws which
have not only the effect but the purpose of disfavoring minor party and
independent candidates.
245
In Thornton the Court distinguished its ballot access jurisprudence
on the basis that the laws challenged therein "regulated election proce-
dures and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification
rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot position"
(italics in original).246 The Court's distinction turned on the fact that peti-
tion requirements are not a qualification for serving office, but only a
procedure for regulating ballot access.247 Thus, any candidate who sub-
mits the required number of signatures and complies with other require-
240. Id. at 514-15.
241. Id. at 523-24 (quoting Smiley v. Hom, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
242. Id. at 526.
243. Id.
244. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1971) (denying equal protection challenge
where minor party candidates were required to collect 88,175 signatures and major party candidates
were granted automatic ballot listing); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (declining to find equal
protection violation where independent candidates were required to collect 325,000 signatures and
major party candidates were granted automatic ballot listing).
245. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Political Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997).
246. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995) (citing, among other cases,
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983); Storer, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Munro v. So-
cialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-195 (1986); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)).
247. Id.
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ments is eligible for ballot listing. By contrast, under the Arkansas
amendment in Thornton, any candidate who had served a certain number
of years in the U.S. House or Senate was automatically disqualified, re-
gardless of compliance with procedures for gaining ballot access. The
Court thus provided a legal basis for distinguishing Thornton from its
ballot access jurisprudence, but the rationale on which the Court relied in
Thornton applies equally to ballot access cases. 248 The Court's overriding
concern in Thornton was the state's effort "to dictate electoral outcomes,
to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitu-
tional restraints" under the guise of procedural regulation. 249 Ballot ac-
cess cases, which arise because states impose unequal burdens on par-
ticular classes of candidates, likewise implicate this concern.
250
Gralike further blurred the distinction between Thornton and the
Court's ballot access jurisprudence. In Gralike, the substantive qualifica-
tion at issue was not incumbency but simply whether candidates sup-
ported a term limits amendment to the U.S. Constitution.25 Thus unlike
Thornton, Gralike did not involve the automatic disqualification of a
class of candidates, but only the burdening of a class of candidates-
those unwilling to support term limits. 252 But whether a candidate sup-
ports term limits is no more a substantive qualification than whether a
candidate supports the Republican or Democratic parties. The legal basis
the Court articulated in Thornton for distinguishing ballot access cases
thus disappears in Gralike. Yet in Gralike the Court held
that the state exceeded its power under the Elections Clause by burden-
ing a particular class of candidates,2 53 whereas in ballot access cases, the
Court routinely holds that states have the power under the Elections
Clause to burden particular classes of candidates. 54 This tension between
the Court's Qualifications Clause cases and its ballot access cases is per-
haps the most compelling evidence yet that the Court's ballot access ju-
risprudence has been inadequate to protect the constitutional rights of
minor party and independent candidates. The Court has declared un-
equivocally that states do not have the power to disfavor a class of can-
248. Id.
249. Id. at 834.
250. Recall, for example, the burden imposed on candidates in Storer, who were required to
collect 13,500 signatures a day for 24 days straight in order to achieve ballot access. See Storer, 415
U.S. at 740. If this is not a substantive requirement in the same sense as incumbency is, the signature
requirement is surely no less an attempt to exclude a class of candidates under the guise of proce-
dural regulation, which the Court rejected in Thornton.
251. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2001).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 524.
254. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835.
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didates: surely this remains true when the class is composed not of major
party but minor party and independent candidates.
A. Ballot Access Laws as Collusion in Restraint of Democracy
The Court's failure to protect candidates' rights in its ballot access
jurisprudence has led some scholars to urge a return to strict scrutiny in
this area of the law. 255 The Court, however, has explicitly rejected this
suggestion.2 5 6 The Court's rationale is rooted in the familiar notion that
substantial regulation of elections is necessary if order is to prevail over
chaos.2 57 Surely this is correct, as far as it goes. Given the necessity for
comprehensive and highly complex regulatory codes, it is unrealistic to
suppose that each regulatory provision should be subject to strict scrutiny
simply because it affects candidates' rights in some way.258 But it should
also be clear that the Court's increasingly deferential posture has been
inadequate to protect those rights, and it simply strains credulity to sug-
gest that self-interested legislation enacted by major party politicians is
the only alternative to chaos.
What is needed to ensure adequate judicial protection of candidates'
rights is not strict scrutiny of every law that affects those rights, but
rather a means to distinguish self-interested legislation by the major par-
ties from legitimate regulation of the political process by the state. As a
practical matter, state action may be indistinct from the concerted action
of the two major parties that dominate the legislatures, but it is not indis-
tinguishable. 259 The distinction can be characterized as the difference
between nonpartisan and bipartisan legislation.260 Nonpartisan legislation
furthers a legitimate state interest; bipartisan legislation, by contrast, fur-
thers the political interests of the parties themselves. Thus, where the two
parties behave as a duopoly, exempting themselves from laws that im-
pose unnecessary burdens on their competitors and lack any justification
in a legitimate state interest, the Court should find the laws presump-
255. See, e.g., Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights, supra note 53. More gener-
ally, scholars have advocated heightened scrutiny of "partisan lock-ups" of the political market and
the entrenchment of the two-party duopoly in the United States. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, su-
pro note 83; Hasen, supra note 100.
256. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
257. Id. at 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
258. See id.
259. Of 7382 seats in the state legislatures, minor party and independent representatives occu-
pied only eighteen, while Republicans and Democrats occupied the rest. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, 2005 PRE-ELECTION PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2005),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/partcomp.cfmyearsel=2005 (last visited Nov. 22,
2005).
260. See SHAPIRO, supra note 5.
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tively unconstitutional. 261 This sort of legislation amounts to a form of
collusion in restraint of democracy.2 62
Distinguishing bipartisan collusion from legitimate state action
need not involve the Court in inappropriate second-guessing of judg-
ments that are better left to the political branches. Collusion is only pos-
sible in the limited situations in which legislators have a direct interest,
in their capacity as legislators, in the legislation that they pass governing
the political process. Most other modem democracies have recognized
the danger that this form of collusion poses to democratic government,
and have taken steps to guard against the threat.2 63 Moreover, in antitrust
cases, the Court regularly distinguishes legitimate business activities
from those that have no purpose apart from their anticompetitive ef-
fects.264 Likewise, collusion in restraint of democracy can be identified as
bipartisan action that has no purpose apart from its anticompetitive ef-
fects on the political process.
This antitrust model of judicial review is most closely associated
with John Hart Ely, who derived an entire theory of judicial review from
the insight of Justice Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene Products
Co. v. United States.265 Justice Stone suggested that heightened judicial
scrutiny was appropriate for "legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of un-
desirable legislation.2 66 In such cases, Justice Stone proposed a "nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality. '267 Ely
thus advocated a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" ap-
261. See id. at 60-62.
262. Id.
263. See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 62, at 49; Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 83, at 690 (stating that "the German Court has taken a far more aggressive approach to
the oversight of political competition, assuming precisely the opposite review posture to that of the
American Supreme Court: 'Parliament's discretion is severely limited when legislating on the right
to elect representatives to legislative bodies: this [limitation] follows from the principles of formal
voter equality and equal opportunity of parties').
264. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(upholding that a price fixing agreement among thousands of artists because it reduced transaction
costs and made mass marketing of performance rights feasible); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding
that any combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, peg-
ging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity is illegal per se); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (upholding a rule that all commodities traders must trade commodities
after hours at the market closing price, because the rule forced all transactions into an atmosphere
where relevant information was equally available to all participants).
265. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1944). See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77
(Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
266. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
267. Id.
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proach to judicial review, under which the role of the Court is to correct
the political processes when they malfunction. 268 The primary incidence
of malfunction Ely identified is "when the process is undeserving of
trust, when the ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.
26 9
Ely did not address modem ballot access legislation, but a better
real-world example of a malfunctioning political process is hard to find.
Discriminatory and restrictive ballot access laws constitute self-
interested bipartisan action. They are unnecessary to promote any legiti-
mate state interest; they infringe upon the constitutional rights of candi-
dates and voters; and they impose anticompetitive restrictions on the po-
litical process, undermining its democratic character and purpose by ex-
cluding legitimate candidates and limiting the role of voters. Far from
deferring to legislative judgment in these cases, the Court should recog-
nize that that judgment is suspect and invalidate legislation where it re-
flects a partisan abuse of state power.
One of the most striking aspects of the Court's ballot access juris-
prudence, however, is its failure to acknowledge that ballot access laws
present a conflict of interest for the politicians who enact them. The
Court never acknowledges that the state to which it so often defers in
ballot access cases is indistinct for practical purposes from the two major
parties.2 70 "The Constitution permits the .. .Legislature to decide that
political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system," the
Court observes, but nowhere acknowledges that the legislature is com-
prised entirely of the Republicans and Democrats who dominate that sys-
tem.271 The Court's failure to distinguish between bipartisan collusion
and legitimate state regulation of the ballot is particularly striking in the
context of an equal protection challenge brought by a minor party or in-
dependent candidate. The crux of such a complaint is that no legitimate
state interest justifies the discriminatory legislation being challenged.
The legal issue is, in effect, whether the challenged action is properly
attributable to the state itself or to the two parties acting under color of
state authority. Deference to the legislature prior to a showing that a le-
gitimate state interest is implicated therefore begs -the above question
268. ELY, supra note 265, at 73-104.
269. Id. at 103.
270. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 57. The vast majority of state
legislatures currently have no minor party or independent representatives. Vermont is a notable
exception, with seven out of 150 representatives in the state House classified as "independent/other."
271. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997). In the Minnesota
legislature, which made the determination in question, there are currently no minor party or inde-
pendent representatives in the state House, and only one non-major-party representative in the Sen-
ate. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 57.
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because if the action is properly attributable to the two parties rather than
to the state, judicial deference is improper. It is the legislature, not the
political parties, to which the Court should defer under our constitutional
democracy.
The application of antitrust principles to the actions of political par-
ties may seem to involve an extension of antitrust law to a "market" it
was never intended to govern. In fact, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
clearly states that antitrust laws do not prohibit people from conspiring to
convince the legislature to take action, even if the action is anticompeti-
tive.272 Presumably this doctrine would exempt Republicans and Democ-
rats from prosecution under the antitrust laws for conspiring to convince
the Legislature to exclude minor party and independent candidates from
the ballot. The argument advanced here, however, is not that the antitrust
statutes should be extended to apply to political parties, but simply that
antitrust law provides an analytic framework for identifying instances of
antidemocratic collusion by political parties. Politicians cannot be trusted
to enforce their own compliance with the rules of the competitive game
any more than corporations can be trusted to enforce theirs, and there is
no reason that the Court should not recognize this simple truth when ana-
lyzing ballot access laws.273
The virtue of applying antitrust principles to the limited sphere of
legislation governing the political process is that it provides the Court
with a means of identifying self-interested legislation that does not re-
quire strict scrutiny of every law affecting candidates' rights. The
Court's ballot access jurisprudence is afflicted with a formalism that ob-
scures plain facts that everyone knows about the real world-first and
foremost, that self-interested legislation is likely to reflect the self-
interest of the legislators enacting it.274 But there is an alternative tomodem ballot access laws other than chaos, and there is an alternative to
272. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In these cases, the Court held
that the antitrust laws were not intended to prohibit people from petitioning the government for
political purposes or otherwise exercising their First Amendment rights.
273. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 64-77. See also Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAnti-
trust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing that the antitrust laws themselves have a politi-
cal dimension-that they were intended not only to embody economic considerations but also to
promote "certain political values," including "a fear that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures").
274. See United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Judges are not necessarily
to be ignorant in Court of what everyone else, and they themselves out of Court, are familiar with.").
For example, the most recent amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from enact-
ing pay raises that take effect before its members face re-election, reflects our well-founded mistrust
of self-interested legislation. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for
the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representa-
tives shall have intervened.").
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total deference to state legislatures other than endless court battles over
the sufficiency of evidence. Where self-interested legislation is found to
constitute antidemocratic collusion, the burden ought to be on the state to
demonstrate that the legislation furthers a legitimate state interest; other-
wise, the legislation should be found unconstitutional. In close cases, the
deference traditionally due the legislative judgment should tip the bal-
ance in favor of a law's legitimacy. Antitrust law, with its focus on le-
gitimate purposes and anticompetitive effects, provides the Court with a
ready-made legal framework for distinguishing between state regulation
and antidemocratic collusion.
To be sure, the approach advocated here would result in the invali-
dation of restrictive and discriminatory modem ballot access laws, but
this would comport with the original purpose of ballot access regulation
by the state, which was to ensure ballot listing for every legitimate can-
didate.275 It would also bring uniformity to the Court's modem ballot
access jurisprudence, which is lacking, and it would reconcile these cases
with the Court's recent Qualifications Clause jurisprudence. Of course,
given the expansive language of the Constitution, the Court's ballot ac-
cess cases might be left to stand as they are. But where the Constitution
admits of conflicting interpretations, the better interpretation is the one
that promotes, rather than restrains, political equality, which is not only a
fundamental democratic principle, but also a moral value that renders the
Constitution worth defending.276
275. See discussion supra Part H.C.
276. See David Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 762 (1987), for an argument that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in a
manner that promotes the moral justification of the resultant decisions.
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